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At the opening of the 2015 International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence, AI 
scholars presented an open letter, calling for a preemptive ban on autonomous robots that can 
choose and kill targets without human intervention (Future of Life Institute 2015). The letter 
cautions against a “global AI arms race” that will eventually make killing easier for terrorists, 
dictators, and warlords—once autonomous weapons can be mass produced as the technology 
matures. Even though the kind of fully autonomous weapons system described in the letter has 
not been developed yet, the letter warns that the development and deployment of lethal 
autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are possible in the next few years. The letter was signed 
by leading AI researchers such as the CEO of Google DeepMind Demis Hassabis, as well as 
famous academics and technology experts such as physicist Stephen Hawking, CEO of SpaceX 
Elon Musk, Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak, and linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist and 
social critic Noam Chomsky. As of November 2016, the letter has been signed by more than 
20,000 people (Ibid.). 
 Even though many scholars and technology experts have voiced concerns about the 
development and future deployment of LAWS, discussion of a preventative ban in the UN has 
been largely unfruitful (Vilmer 2016). This paper views the inability to reach international 
consensus on a LAWS ban from the perspective of “transnational activists” (Tarrow 2005; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998), and attempts to answer the following two questions. First, what effects on 
domestic policy and international law should activists strive for? Second, what available 
strategies can transnational activists adopt to address the political impasse on the international 
arena? 
 On the first question, this paper argues that activists should push for a “ban + regulation” 
framework that incorporates both a partial ban on LAWS and a set of regulations that mandate 
their responsible use. The necessity and appropriateness of the framework are motivated by 
ethical and legal objections to the use of LAWS without direct human control. On the second 
question, this paper embraces a “two-tier approach” of transnational advocacy that addresses 
various causes of the impasse from both the domestic level and the international level. 
 This paper uses the definition of LAWS proposed by Heather Roff: LAWS are learning 
machines that can autonomously target and fire without human intervention (Roff 2014, 212-
214). Although very broad, a more precise definition is unnecessary. As this paper shall 
demonstrate later, disagreement on the definition of LAWS has been a significant barrier to 
international consensus on the regulation of LAWS, and the international community has come 
to recognize that a comprehensive definition is too early at this point (Vilmer 2016). The 
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definition that this paper adopts should be sufficient for laying out the groundwork of LAWS 
policy discussion. The following sections explore the problems that transnational activists are 
faced with and propose some tentative solutions to the identified problems. 
 
The Problems: The History and Contemporary Politics of LAWS 
The use of military “robots” in warfare traces back to World War I, when the United 
States designed a gyroscope-guided missile called the “Bug,” and Germany designed remote-
controlled motorboats that could be fit with explosives (McCormick 2014). However, military AI 
research really began when the Pentagon gave Massachusetts Institute of Technology significant 
funding in 1963 (Ibid.). Much progress has been made worldwide since. By 2001, the United 
States had fully developed drones that could carry Hellfire missiles (Ibid.). In 2005, due to legal 
and technical concerns, the United States military canceled the plan to build a cruise missile that 
could autonomously kill targets on a battlefield, even though the technology for such a weapon 
had long existed (Gubrud 2015). In 2006, South Korea unveiled sentry robots that could 
automatically track and engage targets, although it was reported that human approval was 
required before the robots could fire (McCormick 2014).  
 During the past several years, artificial intelligence research has achieved results that 
were almost unimaginable in the past. The Economist (2016) reports that, due to the use of new 
techniques such as “deep learning” and “neural networking,” the year 2012 marked the 
beginning of several groundbreaking developments in the field of artificial intelligence. In 2012, 
a research team at the University of Toronto significantly improved the image identification 
ability of previous AI algorithms. Three years later in 2015, an AI algorithm beat the average 
human level of 95% accuracy in image identification for the first time in history. The same 
report also mentioned that in 2016, DeepMind, the AI research branch of Google’s parent 
company Alphabet, made headlines when its AlphaGo system beat Lee Sedol, one of the best 
human players in the world, in the ancient Chinese board game Go (Ibid.). For human players, 
the game of Go, in comparison to chess, is a much more intuitive rather than calculative game. 
Even though chess has already been “solved” in the past by machines using brute force 
algorithms, solving the game of Go was considered “a grand challenge for AI” that would lead to 
significant development of AI technology in many areas of application (Gelly et al. 2012, 107). 
These new techniques of artificial intelligence will most likely find military applications and 
accelerate the development of LAWS. 
 The quick development of AI technology supports the researchers’ conclusion in their 
open letter that “artificial intelligence (AI) technology has reached a point where the deployment 
of such systems is — practically if not legally — feasible within years, not decades” (Future of 
Life Institute 2015). Military AI and the deployment of LAWS will revolutionize robotic 
warfare. In response to this trend, different institutions and organizations have reacted 
differently. For example, the Obama administration issued a guideline on the responsible use of 
autonomous weapons systems (Department of Defense 2012), even though the directive is 
described by one commentator as “unremarkable in substance and arguably should apply to any 
weapons system” (Gubrud 2015). Its definition of LAWS has also been criticized for lack of 
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clarity (Roff, quoted in Conn 2016). UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns submitted a report 
on LAWS to the Human Rights Council in 2013, and the report’s main recommendations 
included national moratoria on the development of LAWS and a panel study of the technology’s 
implications (United Nations Human Rights Council, 21). Since 2014, during the annual UN 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), experts and countries have met and 
discussed disarmament of LAWS (Vilmer 2016). However, very little consensus has been 
reached during the three meetings, due to technical and political reasons (Sayler 2016). First, 
since most of the discussion revolves around whether LAWS should be banned or not, states 
have been cautious with their definitions, and little progress has been made as a result (Ibid.). 
Second, despite a shared understanding that LAWS can be dangerous, many states are still 
unwilling to adopt a binding framework or implement a preventative ban just yet (Vilmer 2016; 
Sayler 2016). 
 
The “Accountability Problem” and the “Strategic Robot Problem” 
Without a robust regulatory framework or a comprehensive ban, the deployment of 
LAWS can significantly challenge the force of international law and undermine the military 
command and control structure. LAWS can cause what can be termed the “accountability 
problem”: assigning blame (legal or moral) is impossible or extremely difficult after an accident 
happens. Unless the artificial intelligence that underlies an autonomous weapons system is 
capable of “higher-order intentionality” about its own beliefs, it usually cannot be morally (or 
legally) responsible for the harm it causes (Dennett 1996, 354). The question, then, is who else 
should be responsible for the harm that LAWS may cause, especially since personal 
accountability is central to international law (Human Rights Watch 2015, 13). 
 Unless a set of procedures is in place that ensures human involvement whenever an 
important tactical or strategic decision is made, meaningful personal accountability is nearly 
impossible. In particular, if human intervention is impossible after LAWS is deployed,1 and the 
system violates the international law by, for example, not respecting the humanitarian law 
requirement of proportionality, either the person(s) who chose to deploy the weapon (the 
commander), or the person(s) who programmed the system (the programmer) should take 
responsibility. Lewis (2015, 1324) concludes that the first option is appropriate based on a 
similar requirement in landmine regulation. However, unless the commander was fully aware 
that the deployment of LAWS will or will likely lead to violation of international law, it seems 
unreasonable that the commander should be blamed for their unpredictability, especially if the 
use of LAWS is permitted by international law. As for landmines, there is already a well-  
                                                
1 Note that even semi-autonomous weapons systems defined in the DOD directive does not 
require human intervention after deployed, and semi-autonomous weapons systems are allowed 
to use lethal force under the current guideline. See Department of Defense, Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Arlington, VA: United States 
Department of Defense, 2012), 3, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=726163. 
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established norm against their use, and therefore it is appropriate to blame the commander for 
any unjustified harm that his or her deployed landmines cause. 
 The second option also seems inappropriate, since LAWS are unlike other automated 
weapons that “respond to a preprogrammed set of constraints” (Roff 2014, 212). The 
programmer cannot fully control the autonomous learning process of LAWS. The programmer 
need not even be familiar with the international law, just as the developers of AlphaGo did not 
need to know how to play Go (Gibney 2016, 445).2 In conclusion, unless human control is 
present in every step of LAWS operation, assigning criminal responsibility is almost impossible, 
and international humanitarian law violations may not be punishable. 
 Even if the “accountability problem” can be overcome, LAWS that are used without a 
high level of human involvement can still create what Roff calls the “Strategic Robot Problem” 
(Roff 2014). Since the battlefield evolves very rapidly and the list of targets must be constantly 
reviewed and updated by commanders, the deployed LAWS must either possess preprogrammed 
lists of targets, or be “commanders” that can generate their own target lists. In the first case, 
LAWS must frequently be recalled to receive updated lists, undermining the claim that LAWS 
can be cost effective. In the second case, LAWS might generate conflicting military goals with 
each other, and the multiplicity of strategic actors can undermine the command and control 
structure and make interoperability, an important element of modern warfare, “mere fiction” 
(Ibid., 219-220). Moreover, since LAWS operate in isolation and cannot be held morally 
responsible for their decisions, “moral authority and responsibility […] vanishes” (Ibid., 220). 
For those who believe that moral and criminal accountability are normatively indispensable, both 
the “accountability problem” and the “strategic robot problem” weigh heavily against the use of 
LAWS without a high level of human control and a robust command and control structure.3 
 
The Solutions: The “Ban + Regulation” Model 
Many scholars and experts have advocated for a ban on LAWS (Future of Life Institute 
2015). However, as the past three meetings at CCW show, the disagreement over definition and 
the lack of political will to comprehensively ban LAWS have resulted in a gridlock (Vilmer 
2016; Sayler 2016). Arguing that regulation, rather than a ban, is more effective in ensuring 
compliance and protecting human life, John Lewis (2015, 1310) advocates for LAWS regulation 
modeled after that of landmine use. However, dividing the available action space into ban versus 
regulation presents a false dichotomy. This section argues that a “ban + regulation” model is 
more politically practicable and directly deals with the technical problems mentioned in the 
previous section. Roff (2016, 123) also concedes that regulation is important if a ban cannot be 
                                                
2 In the case of AlphaGo, it was a general-purpose algorithm and was not preprogrammed with 
any Go paradigms. 
3 For more discussion on the ethics of LAWS, see Peter Asaro, “On Banning Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-
Making,” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (2012), 687-709,  
doi: 10.1017/S1816383112000768. 
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accomplished, and that we should think about how ban and regulation can together eliminate the 
dangers of LAWS. This section offers some thoughts on this suggestion.  
 First, due to the nature of AI technology, a “comprehensive” ban on LAWS without 
regulatory support is difficult, if not impossible. As Owen (2016) argues, technology such as 
artificial intelligence cannot be “banned” in the usual sense, especially since AI is a “dual-use” 
technology that has already been developed for peaceful use. He argues that procedural 
regulations can be more effective, since it is the individuals who are accountable (Ibid.). 
Moreover, in contrast to its physical manifestations as “devices,” technology is fluid and cannot 
be neatly “boxed in” by a comprehensive ban. For example, Marshall (1997, 1392) observes that 
even though antipersonnel laser weapons that purposefully blind or severely impair soldiers’ 
vision have been banned by international treaty law, many other military devices that use the 
technology but are not explicitly “antipersonnel” are left out from the treaty and can still blind 
soldiers. Examples include “range finders, target illuminators, and anti-sensor systems.” Since it 
is the devices rather than the technology that are prohibited, the “ban” on laser weapons cannot 
completely eliminate the inherent risk of laser technology. 
 Lewis (2015, 1323-1324) argues that LAWS regulations should follow the example of 
those of landmines. In his view, regulations should take into account their technical details and 
capacity, appropriate environment for their deployment, possible evasion techniques and 
mistargeting, level of human control, and other factors. Borrowing from landmine regulations is 
helpful, especially since there is a high level of compliance with landmine regulations among 
signatories (Bryden 2013, cited in Lewis 2015, 1318). On the issue of human control, Roff and 
Moyes (2016) prefer the concept of “meaningful human control” that ensures informed human 
control and possibility for intervention in every step of the process. 
 In addition to a regulatory framework, a partial ban on certain possible kinds of LAWS 
that are clearly dangerous or unacceptable should still be implemented. Lewis (2015) argues 
against banning LAWS, citing again the landmine example where many states were unwilling to 
accept a ban on landmines and instead opted for moderate regulations of the Amended Protocol 
II (1318-1319). However, Article 3 of the Amended Protocol II, in fact, prohibited the use of 
non-detectable landmines, self-deactivating landmines or landmines that are designed to “cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (United Nations 1996, 135-136). Following this 
example, LAWS that cause “unnecessary suffering” as part of their designs should also be 
banned.  
 
A Two-Tier Approach 
How, then, should activists strive to achieve an international regulatory regime based on the “ban 
+ regulation” model? This section of the paper draws from the constructivism literature and 
transnational advocacy network (TAN) literature in IR theory, and argues that activists should 
adopt a more aggressive and creative approach of norm entrepreneurship and international 
contention. 
 As constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt (1992, 397) argues, relationships between 
states are characterized by “intersubjective understandings and expectations” rather than just 
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pure material interests. Kenneth Waltz’s conception of “self-help” (1979), according to Wendt, is 
only one of many different ways the international system could be organized (Wendt 1992, 400). 
Wendt further argues that “positive interdependence of outcome” can create new understandings 
and expectations in the form of social norms, and commitment to these norms can supersede 
egoism in states’ behavior (Ibid., 417). If constructivism correctly describes the ontology of 
international relations, then establishing a norm of LAWS disarmament may prevent a global 
LAWS arms race and lead to more responsible military use of AI technology. 
 Neo-realists who believe world politics is fundamentally a system of self-help, however, 
would criticize this vision as hopelessly utopian. As Waltz (1979, 102-105) argues, the 
international system encourages power-seeking behavior and pursuit of relative gain. Both 
characteristics tend to encourage a global arms race of LAWS, especially since autonomous 
weapons have been regarded as “the third revolution in warfare” (Future of Life Institute 2015). 
Even Wendt does not “contest the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a 
competitive, self-help world” (1992, 396), and cautions that the transformation of interest and 
identity faces numerous constraints (Ibid., 418). However, the example of nuclear 
nonproliferation shows that pessimism or even fatalism is unwarranted. As Sagan (1996/97, 71-
73, 82-86) observes, domestic actors and constraining international norms can both lead to 
nonproliferation. There is also a strong international norm against the use of nuclear weapons 
(Tannewald 1999, 435). Moreover, between the United States and Russia, significant progress 
has been made in nuclear arms control (Arms Control Association 2014). Thus, self-constraining 
behavior is possible if there is an established norm of disarmament or nonproliferation that stems 
from a shared understanding of the weapon’s danger.  
 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s (2016) report of the third and most recent meeting on 
LAWS at the CCW shows a shared understanding among the states of the potential risk of 
LAWS, but the meeting fell short of building a consensus on its preventative ban. Russia, in 
particular, only wanted a “discussion” on LAWS at this point rather than negotiation of a formal 
framework, and even states that opposed LAWS lacked the political will to advocate for a 
moratorium or preventative ban (Ibid.). In other words, beyond the shared understanding that 
LAWS can be dangerous, states did not feel obligated to agree to a ban. Furthermore, even 
without a ban, there was significant disagreement on what types of regulations should apply 
(Ibid.). For activists who want to create an international norm against the use of LAWS, a two-
tier approach that focuses both on the domestic level and the international level is appropriate. 
 On the domestic level, activists should try to establish a norm against the use of LAWS. 
There have been numerous works published on “norm entrepreneurship” by constructivist and 
transnational advocacy networks (TAN) scholars. Norms are defined as “standard[s] of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity,” such as the norm against the use of 
landmines (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink (Ibid., 893), “[m]any international norms began as domestic norms and become 
international through the efforts of entrepreneurs of various kinds.” Before norms are 
institutionalized as international rules and organizations, norm entrepreneurs must dramatize or 
even “create” issues by using language that resonates with preexisting moral and cultural 
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 understandings, a process usually referred to as “framing” (Ibid., 897-901; Tarrow 2005, 
61;Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Successful framing should depict the issue in unequivocal terms, 
and make experts’ technical information easily digestible for the targeted publics and 
policymakers (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Successful framing should also attempt to “graft” the 
new moral standards onto preexisting ones, especially in disarmament politics (Carpenter 2007, 
103-104). Moreover, since a significant role of transnational activism is to provide information 
and argue for a moral position, a useful frame must “show that a given state of affairs is neither 
natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions” 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A webpage on the website of a campaign against LAWS. Source: Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
“Learn,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2015, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org /learn/. 
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Figure 2. A webpage on the the website of a campaign against LAWS. Source: Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
“The Problem,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2015, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-problem/. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Using cultural symbols such as the Terminator to illustrate the problem of LAWS. 
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Bearing in mind these lessons, this paper proposes that advocacy campaigns should frame 
the regulation and ban of LAWS in terms of well-known cultural symbols that illustrate the 
familiar fear of technology running amok. One such example is the movie The Terminator, 
where a cyborg killer, the Terminator, is sent back in time to kill all women named “Sarah 
Connor” in a particular area (The Terminator 1984). The website of a current campaign against 
LAWS called “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” (Figure 1 and Figure 2) displays only dry and 
technical information about LAWS that has little appeal to those unfamiliar with the subject. 
Figure 3 uses the Terminator as a reference point to illustrate the dangers of LAWS. The last 
point of the section “What Similarities Do Killer Robots Share with the Terminator?” alludes to 
an iconic scene in the movie (Ibid.). The “Do you know?” section informs the reader about 
current United States internal policy on LAWS and its inadequacy (Department of Defense 2012, 
3; Gubrud 2015). Using cultural symbols such as the Terminator, activists can frame the issue of 
LAWS not as a technical issue of weapon regulation or moral philosophy, but as an issue of 
unaccountable and unconstrained use of potentially dangerous technology. 
 Reframing the same issue can be effective in several ways. First, there is already a well-
established norm against the use of Terminator-like technology. A senior Department of Defense 
official, for example, emphasized that the autonomous weapons under development are less like 
the Terminator and more like the Iron Man from the eponymous movie (Rosenberg and Markoff 
2016). There is no need to emphasize the dissimilarity between LAWS and the Terminator 
unless a norm against the development of technology similar to the latter already exists. Thus, 
this paper’s proposed frame follows the “grafting” strategy in issue framing (Carpenter 2007, 
104). Second, the proposed frame casts the issue in a morally unambiguous way. It also allows 
the activists to emphasize and illustrate aspects of LAWS that public opinion polls have shown 
to be the most unnerving, such as circumvention of human decision-making and the machines’ 
lack of moral conscience (Carpenter 2014). Third, as Figure 3 illustrates, the use of cultural 
symbols can make technical information memorable and easy to understand. Fourth, just as 
Skynet is “responsible” for the creation of the Terminator, the proposed frame identifies the 
governments as the responsible parties for the issue (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 19). Finally, just as 
the movie is about the potential danger of misused technology, the proposed frame emphasizes 
the need for regulation and invites concerned citizens to take action against their states’ 
continued development of LAWS and unwillingness to commit to a regulatory framework.4 
 One objection is that such framing is similar to a scare tactic. Intuition may differ here as 
to whether this is the case. If the goal is to inform the public in a creative and memorable way, 
the use of popular culture references should not be problematic. It is important to note that  
                                                
4 Much of the discussion here is U.S. based, mainly because of the importance of the United 
States in international decision-making, the advanced level of technology development in the 
United States, and the fact that the United States is the only country so far to have a written 
guideline on LAWS. See Vilmer, “Autonomous Weapon Diplomacy.” The same strategy, 
however, applies to all western democracies where there is a cultural norm against similar 
technology. 
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calling LAWS “killer robots” is itself an instance of framing, and public opinion research on 
LAWS shows that the label “killer robots” itself does not make the respondents more opposed to 
LAWS. It is the idea of LAWS that is feared (Carpenter 2013). Framing is primarily a tool of 
persuasion and illustration rather than manipulation. While survey research shows that 
respondents often react unfavorably toward the use of LAWS after the concept is explained 
clearly to them (Ibid.; Open Roboethics Initiative 2015, 5), this framing technique aims to 
increase awareness about this highly technical issue and galvanize the public into action. 
 One may also argue that the proposed strategy is better suited for a campaign that aims 
for a complete ban on LAWS rather than a seemingly more compromised position of “ban + 
regulation,” since the proposed frame seems to appeal primarily to the public’s fear of certain 
technologies. Even if it is the case that the strategy will cause people to push for a complete ban, 
international activists can capitalize on that momentum to advocate stricter sanctions and 
regulations on the use of technology than are otherwise possible, especially when partial bans on 
certain clearly dangerous weapons are met with political resistance from nations. As such, the 
end result would ideally look very similar to what the “ban + regulation” model prescribes. 
On the international level, activists should continue to persuade and offer expertise on the 
subject. Despite the observation that international norms usually begin as domestic norms 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893), activists need not only focus on the domestic level, 
especially since CCW meetings are open to experts from NGOs, and there is already a common 
understanding among most participants of the third CCW meeting that LAWS can be potentially 
dangerous (Vilmer 2016). The inability to achieve a binding framework or a preventative ban 
reflects not only the lack of political will, but also the genuine technical difficulty of the subject. 
Activists and experts of LAWS can provide information and propose a regulatory framework to 
facilitate the discussion. The following are some suggestions. First, activists should remind 
participant countries that it may still be too early to settle on any particular definition of LAWS, 
and activists should try to push the discussion toward a more constructive direction. Second, 
activists should continue to advocate that LAWS should be subject to “meaningful human 
control,” where human control takes place or is possible before, during, and after LAWS is 
deployed (Roff and Moyes 2016). Activists should emphasize that only humans can and should 
be responsible for the actions of LAWS. Third, activists should highlight certain similarities 
between LAWS and landmines and “frame” certain regulations of LAWS in terms of landmine 
regulations. This can lead to a helpful shift from the unfruitful discussion of whether all LAWS 
should be banned to the identification of the basic elements of a regulatory element. Fourth, 
activists should advocate for some method of inspection and investigation similar to nuclear 
inspection, so that AI experts, human rights and extrajudicial killings experts, and military 
experts can verify that states are not abusing AI technology or violating international law in the 
development of LAWS. Finally, as more information becomes available and the unacceptability 
of particular types of LAWS becomes well understood, activists should advocate for the ban of 
these types of weapons. 
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